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Abstract
It has long been known that security is easiest to achieve when it is designed in
from the start. Unfortunately, it has also become evident that systems built with
security as a priority are rarely selected for wide spread deployment, because
most consumers choose features, convenience, and performance over security.
Thus security officers are often denied the option of choosing a truly secure so-
lution, and instead must choose among a variety of post hoc security adaptations.
We classify security enhancing methods, and compare and contrast these meth-
ods in terms of their effectiveness vs. cost of deployment. Our analysis provides
practitioners with a guide for when to develop and deploy various kinds of post
hoc security adaptations.
1 Introduction
It has long been known that security is easiest to achieve when it is designed in from the start. Unfortunately,
for a variety of reasons, systems seem to be chosen primarily on the basis of features, and occasionally per-
formance, and rarely on the basis of security. The result is that secure systems are not common, common
systems are not secure, and those desiring security must choose among a selection of techniques for post
hoc security enhancement [2, 7, 17]. The basis for selecting a post hoc security enhancement may even place
security as a secondary consideration, i.e. “whatever bothers the users the least.”
In this paper, we consider the space of post hoc security enhancements and categorize them according to
what is adapted (either the interface or the implementation) and how it is adapted (either restricted or ob-
scured). The classification scheme suggests that some adaptations will have better cost:benefit ratios than
others. Existing and proposed post hoc security enhancements, including some of our own unpublished
techniques, are then placed into this classification scheme, and analyzed for cost:benefit ratios. These expe-
riences tend to confirm the model’s predictions on the relative merits of various kinds of post hoc security
enhancements.
For this paper, the security problems we consider mediating with post hoc security methods are primarily
implementation errors (e.g. buffer overflow vulnerabilities or bad logic) and occasionally design errors (e.g.
dependence on reusable passwords). We characterize these problems as security bugs and refer to the class
of post hoc security enhancements that address them as security bug tolerance [7].
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1.1 Background
The goal of the Blinded project is to enhance operating system survivability with respect to security bugs
using dynamic specialization [5, 23, 29] to induce diversity in the operating system implementation. The
diversity is intended to make exploits (security attacks) non-portable across systems, and also make soft-
ware failures (bugs) independent across redundant nodes. The result should be a redundant cluster of com-
puters, each in a different configuration, such that while an attacker could crack some of the nodes some of
the time, they could not crack all of the nodes all of the time.
This method is a form of “security through obscurity.” The usual reason for rejecting security through ob-
scurity is that the protection is provided by a single “secret” (the obscured implementation) which is difficult
to change, and protection is lost when the secret is discovered or disclosed. I.e. if an encryption scheme de-
pends on a secret algorithm, then most of the security is lost when the algorithm is disclosed. This objection
does not apply to dynamic obscurity, where the “obscurity” secret is repeatedly regenerated by dynamically
reconfiguring each node, seeded with a sufficient source of entropy.
However, we did find it difficult to construct implementation specializations that were effective in defeating
exploits. To be effective, a diversity technique must break some assumption that the attacker depends on,
and yet not break any assumptions that legitimate applications depend on. Preferably, the attacker’s broken
assumptions should not be easy to accommodate, lest the attacker respond with adaptive exploits. In prac-
tice, we found it difficult to create implementation diversities that provided all these properties.
Without abandoning the dynamic diversity defense, we sought to expand our options by generalizing on the
adaptations that can be applied to make software security bug tolerant. We categorize adaptations in terms
of what is adapted, and how it is adapted:
What is Adapted: “What” is adapted is either a component’s interface or its implementation. Naturally,
what is “interface” and what is “implementation” is a relativistic view: an adaptation is an “interface”
adaptation if it affects other components, and it is an “implementation” adaptation if the adaptation has
no externally visible effects other than reduced vulnerability.
How it is Adapted: “How” a component is adapted to reduce vulnerability is either a restriction or an ob-
fuscation. A “restriction” is an adaptation that characterizes some behaviors as “bad”, and a priori pro-
hibits or prevents those behaviors.An “obfuscation” radomizes some aspect of the component while ob-
scuring the current configuration from would-be attackers. This makes it difficult for an attacker to de-
ploy an attack(s), as the configuration details required for the attack cannot be reliability and repeatedly
predicted by the attacker. 
The two values for each of the two dimensions produce a quadrant of security bug tolerance adaptations.
Table 1 shows this quadrant, populated with example security bug tolerance techniques.
Some cells in the quadrant are old (“well-understood”) and thus heavily populated with known examples
and techniques, while others are relatively new and unexplored. It is one benefit of our approach that we are
Table 1: Security Bug Tolerance Techniques
Interface Implementation
Restriction • File system access controls
• Firewalls
• TCP Wrappers
• Java sandbox
• TCP SYN time out
• Small TCB & code removal, i.e. bastion hosts
• Static Type checking
• Dynamic Checking: array bounds checking, asser-
tion checking, StackGuard, non-executable seg-
ments
Obfuscation • Winnowing and Chaffing
• Deception Toolkit
• Random TCP initial sequence number
• Random code or data layout
• Random QoS change
able to evaluate the worth of these new and unexplored techniques without having to learn through experi-
ence (the “hard” way).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 populates our model with example techniques. Sec-
tion 3 describes the model’s predictions for relative strengths and weaknesses. Section 4 evaluates these pre-
dictions by considering the strengths and weaknesses of actual security bug tolerance adaptations from each
cell. Section 5 discusses the implications of our evaluation, providing a preference order for security bug
tolerance techniques. Section 6 presents our conclusions.
2 Populating the Model
This section describes our model for security bug tolerance adaptations in more detail. In Section 1.1, we
defined interface adaptations as those that affect external components, and implementation adaptations as
those with no external visible effects. Section 2.1 and Section 2.2 describe interface and implementation re-
strictions, respectively, and Section 2.3 and Section 2.4 describe interface and implementation obfuscations,
respectively.
2.1 Interface Restrictions
Interface restrictions are more classically known as access controls, which exist to selectively give princi-
pals access to objects. Access controls provide security bug tolerance in that the software on either side of
the interface may have bugs, and the access control mechanism will restrict the set of operations that can be
performed through the interface under various circumstances. Restrictions can be either who can perform
an operation, e.g. Bob can and Alice can’t, or what they can do, e.g. read but not write.
2.1.1 File System Access Controls
File system access controls specify which users and processes may perform what operations on files. The
interface restriction is to prohibit certain operations by certain subjects on certain objects. The long history
of file system access control schemes provides a rich variety of bases on which to make this restriction de-
cision.
2.1.2 Firewalls
Firewalls control access from the outside of a LAN to the inside of the LAN. Access control decisions are
made on a per packet basis: a packet arriving at the firewall is either accepted, returned to the sender, or
dropped on the floor. The basis for the decision varies, depending on the firewall architecture: packet filters
(which inspect only the packet) statefull packet filters (which consider previous packets as well) and appli-
cation proxies (which consider packets in the application’s context).
The interface restriction involved with a Firewall is that only allowed packets are passed through the fire-
wall. For these packets, the firewall is “invisible.” Packets that are not allowed through the firewall are
dropped, an action that has an effect noticeable by the sending agent/component.
2.1.3 Wrappers
A wrapper is a program wrapped around a program suspected of having bugs. The wrapper takes input in-
tended for the subject program and does various integrity checks on it. If the input passes muster, it is passed
on to the subject program, otherwise it is rejected. The interface restriction is that, like firewalls, only ap-
proved input is passed on to the wrapped program.
TCP Wrappers [28] is an example, which acts like a small firewall on the host, restricting access to particular
ports and services. Wrappers have also been applied to vulnerabilities in application programs. Many priv-
ileged programs are sloppily written, and thus vulnerable to “creative” input, such as large strings that in-
duce buffer overflows or other errors. Wrappers have been developed that restrict the syntax of input to priv-
ileged programs to finite-length strings and “safe” character sets [1, 31].
2.1.4 Java Sandbox
The JVM imposes different restrictions on a Java program, depending on whether it was loaded from the
local file system (an application that just happens to be written in Java) or loaded from the network via a
web server (an “applet”). The interface restriction is that downloaded applets are only given access to a re-
stricted subset of the resources that Java applications can access.
2.1.5 TCP SYN Time Out
An attack that is difficult to defend against is the TCP SYN flood denial-of-service attack. Schuba et al [26]
present a solution using a dynamic interface restriction that adjusts the time-out window for TCP connection
requests. When the system feels that it is under attack via SYN flooding, the TCP time-out window is short-
ened, making it more difficult for the attacker to consume all of the TCP buffers. This also has the effect of
making it more difficult for distant users to make connections, but it does protect some of the service by
allowing nearby users to make connections.
2.1.6 Encryption
Encryption is a marginal case; it is either an interface restriction or an interface obfuscation, depending on
one’s perspective. If one views an encryption algorithm as a black box that simply prevents 3rd parties from
obtaining the clear text from the cipher text, then an encryption protocol (such as SSH, SSL, or IPSec) is an
interface restriction that only allows parties with the proper keys to access the interface.
However, if one opens the encryption black box, then the transposition and substitution operations per-
formed by encryption and decryption are actually obscuring the clear text. If one can obtain the proper key
and algorithm, the clear text can be recovered.
For purposes of this paper, we will consider encryption to be an interface restriction. The rationalle is that
we are discussing the security considerations for system & application software, and consider cryptography
to be a separate field of study. This leads to the “black box” view of encryption, and thus the view that cryp-
tographic protocols are interface restrictions.
2.2 Implementation Restrictions
Implementation restrictions are techniques to prevent programs from engaging in undesired behavior. Un-
like interface restrictions, implementation restrictions have no visible effect outside of the adapted compo-
nent. The following are example techniques for preventing applications from performing “bad” operations.
2.2.1 Code Minimization
Since the probability of bugs occurring proportionate to the size of the code [25] reducing the amount of
software included in a component reduces the chance for potential vulnerabilities. This technique consti-
tutes an implementation restriction in that any unnecessary but potentially vulnerable software is removed,
a priori preventing the exploitation of those bugs. This is the basis for keeping TCB’s small, and also the
basis for minimizing the functionality offered by a firewall machine.
2.2.2 Static Type Checking
Strong typing prevents a broad class of errors, but in particular allows use of the type system to protect a
security monitor from the programs it monitors by preventing the program from converting arbitrary inte-
gers into pointers that point at the internal state of the security monitor. Strong typing constitutes an imple-
mentation restriction in that programs are prevented from performing arbitrary operations on typed objects.
Strong typing can be implemented in a number of ways, e.g. the Java type system is enforced both by the
Java compiler and the Java bytecode verifier. Proof-carrying code [20] can be viewed as a special case of
type-checking, where the code provided carries a proof that the code will not perform some class of “bad”
operations.
2.2.3 Dynamic Checking
Dynamic checking, unlike static checking, detects “bad” operations on objects at run-time rather than com-
pile or load time. The classic example is array bounds checking, which is not decidable at compile time, and
so some run time checks must be used to ensure that array bounds are respected. The implementation re-
striction is that programs may not access array members outside of the bounds of the array, i.e. they may
not treat arbitrary chunks of memory as array members.
StackGuard [8] presents a different form of run checking, where the integrity of the process state is inspected
to ensure that a buffer overflow attack has not been used to corrupt the program’s state. The implementation
restriction is that programs may not dereference code pointers that show evidence of corruption.
Yet another approach to dynamic implementation restriction is marking some segments of the process’s ad-
dress space as non-executable. The general concept is to make the data segment of the victim program’s
address space non-executable, making it impossible for attackers to execute the code they inject into the vic-
tim program’s input buffers. This is actually the way that many older computer systems were designed, but
more recent UNIX and MS Windows systems have come to depend on the ability to emit dynamic code into
program data segments. Thus one cannot make all program data segments non-executable without sacrific-
ing substantial program compatibility. However, one can make the stack segment non-executable and pre-
serve most program compatibility. Kernel patches are available for both Linux and Solaris [9, 10] that make
the stack segment of the program's address space non-executable. Since virtually no legitimate programs
have code in the stack segment, this causes few compatibility problems.
2.3 Interface Obfuscations
Interface obfuscation changes the interface to a component such that only one who knows the “secret” of
the current configuration can successfully use the interface. Consider, for example, an object with three
methods: “read”, “write”, and “execute”. The canonical configuration for this object might be for “read” to
be the first method in the object’s method table, “write” the second method, and “execute” the third method.
A simple interface obfuscation would randomly re-order the mapping from the method table to the actual
methods, so that only a client that knows the current configuration can effectively use the object. There are
relatively few instances of tools to systematically obscure interfaces. The only ones we know of that are ef-
fective are as follows:
2.3.1 Deception Toolkit
The deception toolkit (DTK) [3] provides tools to spoof the existence of service, e.g. a fake mail server.
These faux servers area form of honeypot, intended to draw the attacker’s attention away from the machine
that is running an actual service. To hold the attacker's attention, the faux servers emulate vulnerable servers,
producing results that are interesting to the attacker in response to common attacks against known vulnera-
bilities.
The DTK is an interface obfuscation with a small search space. The obscured component of the interface is
the name of the machine running the actual server. This search space is problematic, because it is only as
large as the number of machines in the defender’s domain, compounded by the fact that it is often easy to
discover the true location of many servers, such as mail and web servers. The DTK compensates for this
small search space by substantially enhancing the “mystery” effect: the attacker sees what appears to be a
forest of servers.
2.3.2 Chaffing & Winnowing
This novel cryptographic technique [24] was designed to subvert various legal restrictions on strong cryp-
tography. Winnowing and chaffing does not alter the clear text data in any way; the clear text is sent in the
clear. Instead, winnowing & chaffing obscures the clear text by surrounding it with a great deal of “noise”
data. The “key” is an authentication protocol to select true data bits and “winnow” away the “chaff” bits.
Like encryption, chaffing & winnowing is a marginal case between interface restrictions and interface ob-
fuscations. It nominally presents the same properties as encryption: technique in that both ends of the com-
munication must be aware of the protocol, and they share a secret (the current key for selecting data from
chaff). Thus chaffing & winnowing could be considered an interface restriction.
However, for legal purposes, chaffing and winnowing emphasizes the fact that the clear text is transmitted
in the clear. In particular, chaffing & winnowing allows for 3rd parties to do the chaffing for you, without
sharing your keys. For this reason, we classify chaffing & winnowing as an interface obfuscation.
2.3.3 Capability Enforcement
Capability systems leave resources “in the open”, accessible to anyone with the right “ticket” to access the
resource. Most capability systems enforce the access control semantics of capabilities through interface re-
strictions that make the “tickets” unforgeable, i.e. the adversary cannot create a capability out of thin air.
Some systems do this with tagged memory systems (e.g. AS/400) while others do this through strict type
checking (e.g. Java).
An interface obfuscation version of capability enforcement is the large single address space model, where
all resources reside in a single, very large address space, i.e. with 128 bit addresses. It is conjectured that the
adversary will not be able to find resources unless given the correct address, since the address space will
consist mostly of un-mapped pages that produce faults when probed.
2.4 Implementation Obfuscations
Implementation obfuscations do not remove vulnerability to bugs, but rather seek to make attacks that ex-
ploit implementation bugs non-portable, so that the attacker has to adapt the attack program to each config-
uration of a permutable implementation. By synthetically diversifying implementations in this way, one can
employ physical redundancy (i.e. redundant servers) as a fault-tolerance technique against security attacks.
In the same way that a biodiverse population survives a plague, a diverse population of implementations can
have some members survive a single security attack.
The challenge of implementation obfuscation is to find a systematic way of permuting the implementation
such that:
• The program continues to function as specified, and
• Hypothesized attacks against the program do not function as intended.
Again, there are very few successful techniques. The following techniques have succeeded in employing
implementation obfuscation to enhance security.
2.4.1 Random TCP Initial Sequence Number
During the setup of a TCP connection, the TCP protocol negotiates an initial sequence number. If the initial
sequence number is easy to guess, then the attacker can hijack the TCP session [14]. Early TCP implemen-
tations chose ‘1’ as the initial sequence number. Newer TCP implementations try to choose an initial se-
quence number that is harder to guess.
At first glance, this might appear to be an interface obfuscation. However, because the selection of the initial
sequence number is entirely one-sided (the server chooses the number, and then tells the client) it does not
require any changes in the client’s behavior. Thus since this technique does not require any client changes,
we define it to be an implementation obfuscation (see Section 1.1).
2.4.2 Random Code Or Data Layout
This class of adaptations tries to break attacks that depend on specific properties of code or data layout in
memory. Almost all attacks that depend on memory layout are buffer overflow attacks in which the attacker
exploits weak array bounds checking (inherent to C programs) to enable corruption of adjacent program
state. The implementation obfuscation is to randomize key properties of implementations that buffer over-
flow attacks depend on: adjacency and location.
Forrest et al [12] deployed a simple gcc enhancement that randomly permutes the size of stack frame acti-
vation records. Like StackGuard [8] and segment execution restrictions [9, 10] (see Section 2.2.3) this is
designed to stop stack smashing attacks. Unlike the implementation restrictions, this technique tries to make
the critical data structures in memory difficult to hit. Memco3 has developed a similar product called STOP:
Stack Overflow Protection [18] that allocates stack buffers in random locations.
2.4.3 QoS Change
This is a class of defenses against attacks that critically depend on timing to function. The notion is to ran-
domly change the QoS (Quality of Service) delivered to different system components, so that the attacker
cannot depend on the expected time the system will take to perform a given operation. Again, this technique
obscures an aspect of the implementation that an attacker depends on: the expected time to perform a par-
ticular operation. This technique is most often deployed to defend against timing covert channels: the range
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of randomness in the quality of service imposes an upper bound on the bandwidth of a timing channel, but
does not close the channel [21].
2.4.4 Natural N-Version Programming
Koopman and DeVale [16] studied natural diversity in operating system implementation. While not a se-
curity study, this work examines operating system robustness with respect to failure modes by presenting
erroneous input to various system call interfaces for each operating system. The study compares 13 diverse
operating systems that all supported a POSIX interface. In this study, they tested each OS implementation
for its correct response to various erroneous inputs. They found that large amounts of diversity are effective
in enhancing robustness, in if one takes the best case behavior of all 13 tested operating systems, less than
5% of all failure conditions found were common to all 13 implementations. However, they also found that
low degrees of diversity are relatively ineffective, in that if one chooses the two most diverse OS implemen-
tations possible (FreeBSD and AIX), then 9.7% of the failures are common to both OS implementations.
3 Model Predictions
This section considers what our model predicts in terms of the relative strengths and weaknesses of each
cell in the quadrant in Table 1. Section 3.1 compares the two columns: interface vs. implementation adap-
tations. Section 3.2 compares the two rows: restrictions vs. obfuscations.
3.1 Interface vs. Implementation Adaptations
Interfaces are where accesses happen. As such, the interface semantics is what specifies our security poli-
cies. Interface adaptations act to improve the control over the operations subjects can perform on objects.
These techniques might improve the abstraction or granularity of the access control specification (improv-
ing the defender’s understanding of the configuration) or may act to obscure the specification so as to make
attacks against configuration errors more difficult.
Implementations are what enforce the interface semantics. Implementation adaptations act to bolster the se-
mantics of our interfaces. In particular, implementation adaptations provide protection against failures in
access controls, especially due to errors in the implementation of the interface semantics.
Thus interface adaptations are the primary goal of a security enhancement. Implementation adaptations
complement interfaces by acting to ensure that the interface’s semantics will be enforced.
3.2 Restriction vs. Obscurity Adaptations
The dominant difference between restrictions and obfuscations is that restrictions reduce the amount of
damage the attacker can impose, while obfuscations increase the cost of the attacker successfully exploiting
a bug. Restrictions reduce potential damage either fractionally by disabling some operations, probabilisticly
by disabling some principals from accessing the object in the hopes of containing the attacker, or completely
by preventing any principal from performing operations that are always deemed to be “bad.” Obfuscations
restrict nothing, and only make it more work for the attacker to find the bug they’re looking for so they can
exploit it [25].
We also suspect that obfuscations are more difficult to make effective. An effective obfuscation must pre-
serve many invariants in order to preserve interoperability with legitimate clients, while simultaneously
breaking sufficient invariants to make attacks ineffective. Choosing effective invariants is made difficult by
the fact that the invariants needed for legitimate interoperability are often subtle and implicit, and the invari-
ants needed by attackers are completely unknown. We postulate that, given sufficient information to effec-
tively deploy an obfuscation, that a more effective restriction could be deployed in its place:
Interface Obfuscations: Since interface obfuscations necessitate distribution of the current configuration
to authorized clients, knowledge of the current configuration acts as an authentication token. An inter-
face restriction using sufficiently strong cryptographic authentication is probably easier to deploy than
an equivalent-strength interface obfuscation.4
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Implementation Obfuscations: Implementation obfuscations must be faithful to the program’s specifica-
tion, or else they become implementation restrictions. Very few implementation vulnerabilities are in-
dependent of the program’s specification5, so finding effective implementation obfuscations depends on
finding an obfuscation that works in the “gap” between the program’s specification in the source code
and the implementation in executable instructions, which is difficult. We postulate that restricting the
implementation of the virtual machine that executes the instructions is more effective and easier than im-
plementation obfuscation, e.g. the Java bytecode verifier, or StackGuard’s restriction on corrupting ac-
tivation records on running functions.
Thus one must be cautious when presented with a obfuscation security bug tolerance technique. What is the
obscurity protecting, and how effective is it? For instance, the deception toolkit [3] is most effective at dis-
guising a genuine service provider by surrounding it with faux service providers. However, it is not difficult
for the attacker to identify the genuine service provider by other means, i.e. solicit an e-mail reply from a
naive user and inspect the mail headers. Obscuring the size of stack frame activation records [12] success-
fully defeats simple stack smashing attacks because they depend on a static stack layout, but it is not difficult
is it to construct stack smashing attacks that can adapt to a dynamic stack layout [8, 22].
Implementation obfuscations that are both transparent to the application programmer and effective in de-
feating or slowing attacks require a lot of information. We conjecture that if one has sufficient information
for any given implementation obfuscation, that this information could be used to more easily deploy either
an interface obfuscation, or an implementation restriction, which we suspect would be easier to implement,
more effective, or both. For instance, while Forrest’s compiler (an implementation obfuscation) makes cer-
tain stack smashing attacks more difficult to deploy, a similar implementation restriction in StackGuard (an
implementation restriction) makes an identical attack impossible.
4 Evaluating the Model
Here we evaluate the predictions from Section 3 by directly comparing competing security bug tolerance
techniques that reside in different cells in the quadrant, but that have similar goals. As in Section 3, we first
compare interface vs. implementation techniques in Section 4.1, and then compare restriction vs. obscurity
techniques in Section 4.2.
4.1 Interface vs. Implementation Techniques
The model does not make strong preferential predictions here. As discussed in Section 3.1, the interface
must be sufficient to specify the operations that subjects may perform on objects. Interface adaptations that
enhance the ability of the interface to specify who may do what to which are a primary means to enhancing
security. In subtle contrast, implementation adaptations enhance the ability of implementations to enforce
interface semantics. Thus interface and implementation techniques complement each other, as illustrated by
these examples of using both:
Firewalls: Firewalls are a technique to enhance interface restrictions at the network level, and thus employ
interface restrictions. Firewall employ implementation restrictions, primarily in the form of code mini-
mization to minimize potential vulnerabilities in the firewall itself. 
Java Security: Java security employs interface restrictions in the form of the “Java sandbox”, which pre-
vents mobile applets from accessing more than a trivial set of file system and network resources. These
interface restrictions are enforced by the security_monitor object. Java security employs imple-
mentation restrictions in the form of static and dynamic type checking, to prevent hostile applets from
corrupting the state of the security_monitor object.
Both of the above systems employ interface restrictions to enhance the expressiveness of the specification
of “who” may do “what”, and both employ implementation restrictions to ensure that the interface restric-
tions remain in force in the face of adversity. Thus interface and implementation adaptations seem to be
complementary.
5.Because implementation vulnerabilities precisely exploit errors in the implementation, by definition they
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4.2 Restriction vs. Obscurity Techniques
Here we examine the relative strengths of restriction adaptations vs. obscurity adaptations. Section 4.2.1
compares interface restrictions vs. interface obfuscation, and Section 4.2.2 compares implementation re-
strictions vs. implementation obfuscations. In all of the cases we examined, we found restrictions to be the
more effective technique, and in only a few cases did we find obfuscations adding any value beyond that
provided by restrictions.
4.2.1 Interface Restriction vs. Interface Obfuscations
Here we compare competing techniques employing interface restrictions and interface obfuscations.
Morphing File System vs PACLs: The Morphing File System (MFS, part of the Blinded project) is a
defense that we designed and implemented to protect sensitive files (e.g. /etc/passwd) from attack by re-
naming them to something obscure, and only “telling” the true name to programs that need to access
these sensitive files. All other programs trying to find these sensitive files must search through a “forrest”
of fake files, trying to determine which is the real one. MFS is an interface obfuscation in that the name
of the object to be accessed has been obscured, and only clients knowing the true name can access the
object.
While the MFS was “successful” in that it did make it hard for attacking programs to find the sensitive
files, it was also complex and brittle. The MFS achieves precisely the semantics of Levitt’s PACLs (Pro-
gram Access Control Lists) [30]: disclosing the true name of an obscured file to a program is identical
to adding the program to the ACL. PACLs are simpler to administer, and thus more likely to be admin-
istered correctly. PACLs can be implemented more simply, and thus are more likely to be implemented
correctly. Thus for controlling program access to file system resources, interface restrictions seem to be
more cost-effective than interface obfuscations.
Firewalls vs. DTK: Both firewalls and the DTK seek to protect vulnerable host systems from external net-
work attack. Firewalls protect “inside” hosts by restricting the operations that external nodes may per-
form on internal nodes. DTK protects hosts by “chaffing” the LAN environment with numerous faux
servers, making it more difficult for the attacker to locate the true server of a given service.
The problem with the DTK defense is that the search space (which machine is the real server?) is small,
and the true server is easy to discover via other means (e.g. discover the mail server by inspecting mail
headers). In contrast, the protection provided by firewalls is absolute: if the mail server is not to be ac-
cessed by outside hosts, then the firewall will not allow such packets to be delivered.
Chaffing & Winnowing vs. Encryption: While the chaffing & winnowing [24] interface obfuscation tech-
nique (see Section 2.3.2) does achieve effective confidentiality, it does so with very poor efficiency: the
amount of raw data to be transmitted is very large relative to the payload. In contrast, the interface re-
striction technique of using classical encryption (see Section 2.1.6) achieves a similar degree of confi-
dentiality with much greater efficiency.
Capability Enforcement: While the notion of enforcing non-forgeable capabilities using very large ad-
dress spaces is intriguing (see Section 2.3.3) it has not yet been shown to be feasible. Memory-based ca-
pability enforcement imposes substantial implementation and performance overhead, but type-based en-
forcement seems to eliminate most of those costs. Obscure addresses in large address spaces would seem
to impose performance costs due to the size of pointers, while not delivering any enforcement improve-
ments relative to type- and memory-based enforcement mechanisms.
In all of these examples, we observe two patterns. First, in all cases the interface restriction techniques are
more cost effective than the interface obfuscation techniques, in that restrictions either deliver more security
for the same complexity (Firewalls vs. DTK) or deliver the same security with less complexity (MFS vs.
PACLs and Chaffing & Winnowing vs. Classical Encryption). Second, the interface obfuscations do add
security value relative to a system that has no corresponding adaptations applied.
Because simplicity is such a fundamental consideration in construction secure systems [25] it is important
to choose the simplest means possible to achieve a given goal. Thus because interface restrictions seem to
achieve the same results as interface obfuscations via simpler means, or greater security via similarly com-
plex means, the suggestion for practitioners is to apply interface restrictions first to achieve the desired level
of security. Only if all practical interface restrictions have been applied and security is still not sufficient
should interface obfuscations be considered.
For example, adding a firewall or strengthening the firewall’s rules is likely more effective than deploying
the DTK. But if the firewalls rules are already as strict and precise as possible, then deploying the DTK will
further enhance security.
4.2.2 Implementation Restriction vs. Implementation Obfuscations
Here we compare competing techniques employing implementation restrictions and implementation obfus-
cations.
Memory Restrictions vs. Memory Obfuscations: Here we compare an assortment of memory access re-
striction techniques vs. memory layout obfuscation techniques. Memory access restriction techniques in-
clude generic techniques such as array bounds checking [15, 4] and debugging memory monitors [13] as
well as security-specific techniques such as StackGuard [8] and non-executable segments [9, 10] (see
Section 2.2.3) all of which act to restrict memory usage patterns that are considered “bad.” Memory ob-
fuscation techniques, in contrast, randomize some aspect of the layout of data or code in memory to make
it difficult for buffer overflow attacks to accurately target critical pieces of program state (see Section
2.4.2). 
The problem with memory obfuscation techniques is that attackers have developed adaptive attack meth-
ods that do not need to know the precise layout of memory [22, 11, 19, 27] limiting the effectiveness of
this technique. For instance, an attacker does not need to know the precise offset of a buffer containing
attack code; the attacker can prepend a string of NOP instructions in front of the attack code, and “lob”
flow control into the midst of this field of NOPs.
In our own work, we investigated an enhancement to the StackGuard “terminator canary” mechanism
[6]. A vulnerability arose, allowing attackers to undetectably corrupt stack frames protected with the
“terminator” style of StackGuard protection. We investigated adding “jitter” to the position of the termi-
nator canary, but found this to be difficult because the gcc compiler assumes a fixed offset between the
stack frame and the local automatic variables. Use of StackGuard’s “random canary” was found to be
both more effective and more efficient.
Generalizing on this point, it is often said that the art of system design is the continuous insertion and
removal of levels of indirection. Memory diversity defenses usually introduce an additional level of in-
direction for every object to be moved about. Memory obfuscation defenses that do not need to add a
level of indirection often are ineffective, because it is precisely those techniques that attack programs can
adapt to. Thus memory obfuscation will likely often introduce performance overhead and implementa-
tion complexity.
Cryptographic Authentication vs. Random TCP Initial Sequence Numbers: The random TCP initial
sequence number implementation obfuscation technique described in Section 2.4.1 is effective at defeat-
ing some of the methods for hijacking TCP connections. However, an interface restriction technique of
using cryptographically strong authentication and session encryption (see Section 2.1.6) is much more
effective at stopping most kinds of TCP/IP session hijacking. The major advantage to the random initial
sequence number is precisely that it is an implementation adaptation, and does not require modified cli-
ent software, while cryptographic protocols require protocol-compliant peers or clients.
Random QoS Changes vs. Isolation: The implementation obfuscation technique of random QoS changes
is effective at limiting the bandwidth timing covert channels, but does not eliminate them [21]. Extensive
research into covert channel analysis has shown that it is very difficult to eliminate timing covert chan-
nels. Given the prevalence of cheap commodity computers, a brute force interface restriction approach
of “put different security levels on different machines” seems to be easier and more effective than elab-
orate implementation obfuscations, which only limit covert channel bandwidth.
As in interface adaptations (see Section 4.2.1) we find that restrictions are more cost-effective than obfus-
cations. This finding is supported by Koopman and DeVale’s finding [16] that natural diversity is of limited
value in enhancing operating system robustness against simple error handling. However, the case is weaker
than in interface adaptations: there are instances, such as hardening TCP, where implementation obscurity
offers a benefit similar to an interface restriction. In a widely networked setting, backward software com-
patibility is at a premium, and so a technique that allows us to use an implementation adaptation rather than
an interface adaptation may be much easier to deploy. Thus our recommendation to practitioners is to use
implementation restrictions where possible, and to deploy implementation obfuscations in cases where in-
terface restrictions would otherwise be required but are not viable.
5 Discussion
Section 4.1 argues that interface
adaptations and implementation
adaptations are complementary,
but that interface adaptations are
more fundamental to security.
Section 4.2 presents numerous
examples of competing restric-
tion and obfuscation adaptations
that show that restrictions are
more cost-effective than obfusca-
tions. These two conclusions induce the partial order of security bug tolerance techniques shown in Figure 1.
These results may be controversial. On one hand, some may argue that lending any credibility to obscurity
techniques is questionable. On the other hand, some might suggest that our preference for restrictions over
obfuscations is too hasty. Here we seek to address both concerns.
Concerning the basic criticism of “security through obscurity” the various obfuscation techniques presented
here clearly show that a carefully crafted obfuscation does add security value to a system. In some selected
cases (Chaffing & Winnowing in Section 2.3.2, and random TCP initial sequence number in Section 2.4.1)
obfuscation delivers a security property that is otherwise unobtainable for non-technical reasons (export
control legality and backward compatibility, respectively). The crucial issue is that the obscurity must be
dynamic, so that the security provided by the obscurity is not destroyed as soon as attackers learn of the ob-
scurity technique.
Concerning the criticism that our preference for restrictions is hasty, we have several responses. First, it has
been known for a long time that simplicity is critical to the implementation of secure systems [25]. All of
the examples we have studied clearly show that restriction techniques are simpler to implement than obfus-
cation techniques, and thus are more likely to be implemented correctly.
Second, we want to emphasize that we are not claiming that obscurity techniques have no value, only that
obscurity is less cost-effective than restriction. Obscurity advocates often employ analogies to biodiversity
as a defense against disease in the organic world. We observe that in the organic world, restrictions such as
skin, nose hair, eyelashes, mucus membranes, and antibodies form the primary defense against disease.
Biodiversity is effective, but only at preventing complete catastrophe; restrictions also play an essential role
in defending organisms against attack.
6 Conclusions
We have examined the difficult problem of post hoc enhancement of a system’s security. We categorized
post hoc security enhancements according to what they adapt (interfaces and implementations) and how
they adapt it (restrictions and obfuscations). This model predicts a preference order of these techniques. Our
model, populated with numerous example techniques of our own and from the literature, show that while
obfuscations do add some security value, restrictions are more cost-effective than obfuscations. Our analy-
sis provides a guide to security practitioners of when it is appropriate to develop and deploy a given kind of
post hoc security adaptation.
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